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1 SOVIET INSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE2 
Three of the most important Russian agrarian institutions are the subsistence 
household farm (personal auxiliary farm), the collective farm, and the district 
administration.  
Before collectivisation, the Russian peasant farms were primarily subsistence 
farms. Each peasant farm had two types of land plots: a farmstead plot and field 
plot(s). After 1917 the land belonged to the state but the village community 
possessed the land around the village and distributed and redistributed field 
plots between households according to the numbers of people in the family 
('eaters'). Collectivisation did not totally liquidate subsistence peasant farms; it 
collectivised field plots and diminished the number of animals allowed for each 
household to a subsistence minimum. For most of the Russian peasant 
households, the number of personal animals kept by a family did not diminish 
because before collectivisation they kept just this subsistence minimum3. Later, 
in order to underline the priority of the work on collectivised fields and 
auxiliary character of the work in household farms, the latter were called 
Personal Auxiliary Farms (PAF). Stalin started the mass collectivisation not 
exclusively for ideological reasons, but rather for a pragmatic purpose of 
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 An analysis of the "dependence path" of the Russian agriculture is made in (YEFIMOV 2001, 2002). 
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 The most important legislative act concerning Soviet agriculture (Standard Statute of Kolkhozes of 
1969/1980) determined the limits for household farms in the following way: farmstead plot – 0.5 ha, one cow 
with a calf younger than one year, one head of fattening cattle younger than two years, one sow younger than 
three months or two fattening hogs, ten sheep or goats, bees, poultry and rabbits. The average Russian peasant 
farm as it was just before the collectivisation is characterised in the Table 1 of the Appendix.  
 extracting resources from the countryside, which was primarily subsistence-
oriented4.  
The subsistence character of Russian peasant farms before and after 
collectivisation is their "genetic" feature. M. SAHLINS (1972) generalised survey 
results for Russia undertaken at the beginning of the last century5 as the 
"Chayanov rule", according to which "the bigger labour capacity of a 
household, the less its members work efficiently" because their aspiration levels 
are low and correspond to a subsistence minimum. My surveys in collective 
farms of Northern Kazakhstan in 1996-1997 and in Samara province in 1997-
1998 witnessed a subsistence-orientation of rural dwellers. They indicated the 
same number of animals in their PAF answering two different questions: 1. 
How many animals it is necessary to keep in your PAF just to survive? 2. How 
many animals it is necessary to keep in your PAF in order to live well? If I tried 
to convince my respondents that a bigger number of animals would increase the 
well-being of the family they reacted by saying that if they had more animals 
they would have to work too hard.  
The nature of the institution of collective farms (kolkhoz) cannot be understood 
properly without PAF. The PAFs are the direct continuation of Russian peasant 
subsistence farms from the pre-collectivisation period. Before the 1960's, the 
PAF were the only source of survival for Russia's rural population. Even during 
the most favourable stages of the post-collectivisation period, the share of PAF 
in incomes of members of collective farms did not drop below 20%6. This 
helped to provide enough potatoes, vegetables, meat, milk and eggs to them. In 
the1990's, this share increased in many former collective farms up to 100%. 
Currently, this is almost the only source for many rural families. The Russian 
collective farms have never been, and are still not agricultural enterprises 
(businesses). They served as state control mechanisms of the distribution and 
usage of agricultural products, and at the same time as mechanisms of survival 
for the rural population (resources of collective farms could be used for PAF 
only by members of collective farms). In the1990's, the first function of 
collective farms almost disappeared and the second drastically increased. PAFs 
as subsistence household farms are known to be unable to exist without links 
with a large neighbouring farm. That is where (often unofficially) most of the 
fodder for personal livestock comes from. In case of a real, not imaginary 
privatisation, an end will be put to this situation. Animals of typical PAF are fed 
not from farmstead plots (0.25 ha – 0.5 ha), but from collective farm produce. A 
typical PAF would need a 'field plot' of 3 ha – 6 ha to feed them7. The rural 
                                           
4
 See the Table 2 of the Appendix.  
5
 See Tables 3 and 4 of the Appendix.  
6
 See Table 5 of the Appendix. 
7
 A French agricultural economist 40 years ago aptly described collective farm – household farm relations in 
the USSR: "Un kolkhozien qui a, comme c'est le cas au Kouban, une vache, deux jeunes bovines, une truie et 
dwellers accept it because the work on collective fields is totally mechanised 
and the most of the work in PAF is manual.  
The connection between subsistence household farms and a kolkhoz/sovkhoz 
was not limited to receiving feed only. Kolkhoz/sovkhoz was more than a 
workplace for countrymen; it was the habitat. It provided a great variety of 
services. It is now increasingly hard for kolkhoz/sovkhoz (or former 
kolkhoz/sovkhoz) to do so due to a lack of money.  
There is a myth about the efficiency of PAFs. They often say that PAFs occupy 
3% of agricultural land and produce more than 50% of the volume of the 
agricultural production of the country. As we have just remarked, the livestock 
in many PAFs is fed by forage produced in collective farms. The leading role of 
PAFs in some sectors of crop production is explained not by higher yields (in 
1998 yields of potato in PAFs were 9.6 t/ha and in collective farms – 9.7 t/ha), 
but by the fact that collective farms occupy, for certain crops (for example 
potato), less land than PAFs. The increase of the share of PAFs in Russian 
agricultural production comes primarily from the drop in production of 
collective farms. The growth of PAF production in 1998 in comparison with 
1990 was 12.6%, but the livestock production in PAF 1998 decreased by 10% 
in comparison with 1990. This decrease is determined by the dependency of the 
PAF livestock production on collective farms fodder production, which have 
now weaker potential than before. In the1990's, the subsistence character of 
PAFs became stronger than before. In 1991, 28.5% of potatoes produced by 
PAFs were sold on the market; in 1998 they sold only 10.2%. The same 
tendency is seen in PAF livestock production: meat – 30.1% in 1991, and 
22.4% in 1998; milk and dairy products – 25.1% in 1991 and 18.3% in 19988.  
Sometimes, opinions are raised that the PAFs serve as a school for private 
farming for members of collective farms. I do not share this opinion in the case 
of Russia. The PAF experience, where most of the work is done not by men but 
by women, does not suit private agricultural businesses for several reasons. 
First of all, the PAFs are not agricultural businesses but subsistence farms and 
the family consumes most of its produce. Owners of PAFs are not used to 
making transactions about inputs and outputs of their farms. They 'take' inputs 
from collective farms. In the past, they also sold their products to the collective 
farm, but now most collective farms have stopped this practice. Now, 
intermediaries coming to the village buy, at a very low price, most of the PAFs 
                                                                                                                                    
six porcelets et une cinquantaine de poules, n'utilise pas seulement une parcelle de 0.25 hectare, mais aussi la 
surface nécessaire pour nourrir les animaux puisque les aliments du bétail lui sont fournis en nature par le 
kolkhoze. On peut dire que son exploitation couvre effectivement de 3 á 6 hectares suivant la qualité du sol. 
On retrouve tout à fait la consistance des petites exploitations de subsistance en France." (DE CHOMBART 
LAUWE 1961, pp. 140-141).  
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 These judgements are made on the basis of the Russian official statistics (see Tables 6 – 12 of the Appendix). 
It is necessary to take in account that their exactness could be doubtful.  
 products oriented for sale. Many trials to create marketing and other types of co-
operatives for the owners of PAFs have failed. The primitive technologies used 
in PAFs are incompatible with competitive businesses. 
In their current form, the agricultural enterprises essentially remain Soviet 
kolkhozes/sovkhozes (collective state farms), whatever one calls them 
(partnerships, co-operatives, joint stock companies, etc.). These large-scale 
farms are not efficient because of diseconomies of scale and, not least, because 
of the inefficient property structure, where workers and pensioners of the farm 
own the farm on a quasi-egalitarian basis. These old-fashion Soviet-type 
agricultural enterprises tolerate and even need the agrarian administrative 
system. On the other hand, this administrative system would automatically lose 
most of its power upon the radical reform of agricultural enterprises. 
A very significant difference between the management in Soviet agriculture and 
that in Soviet industry was its direct stewardship by communist party 
committees at regional levels. The first secretary of the district (rayon) 
communist party committee was the main decision maker in this branch of the 
Soviet economy. The district's department of agriculture helped him to make 
decisions, but  never  made them in his stead.. 
Current district administrations coming to substitute the "Party and Soviet 
organs" with the help of their departments of agriculture fulfil, in many 
respects, the same functions as in the Soviet past, among them: the distribution 
of subsidies and inputs provided in credit (fuel, fertilisers, and seeds). In many 
cases, these credits, as in Soviet times, are not paid back. Because most of the 
agricultural enterprises are bankrupt and their current bank accounts are 
blocked, district administrations participate in the development of financial 
schemes to provide cash for collective farms. 
2 OBJECTIVES AND LEGISLATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN POST-SOVIET 
RUSSIA 
The objective of post-Soviet agrarian reform in Russia was transition to 
western-style agriculture. Two legislative acts provided the basis of this reform: 
the Decree of the President of Russian Federation of December 27, 1991, "On 
urgent measures of accomplishment in land reform in the Russian Federation" 
(PASHOV 1999), and the Resolution of the Government of Russian Federation of 
December 29, 1991 "On the rules of the reorganisation of collective and state 
farms" (PASHOV 1999).  
The Decree of the President provided that the state and collective farms were 
obliged in 1992 to undergo reorganisation. They were to put their juridical 
status in conformity with the Law "On the enterprises and entrepreneurial 
activity", in which such forms of enterprises as collective farms and state farms 
were not stipulated. The local bodies of the executive authority were 
recommended to ensure the control of realisation of the right of the members of 
collective farms and workers of the state farms for an unobstructed exit from 
these farms for the creation of private peasant farms. The collectives of 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes using the land with the right of permanent use 
according to this Decree had to take the decision before March 1, 1992 on 
transition to private individual, collective-shared and other patterns of 
ownership. The local administrations had to supply the citizens becoming the 
proprietors of land appropriate certificates on the land property rights. The 
Decree laid under obligation the heads of collective and state farms to allocate 
land shares to the workers and members of their families within one month from 
the date of submission of the application for the creation of a peasant farm. The 
property shares were also simultaneously with land shares. In the case of delay 
with the allocation of land and property shares, the heads of farms were fined at 
a rate of three monthly salaries by local bodies of the Committee on land reform 
and land resources. The same Decree granted peasant farms the right of land 
mortgage in banks, and banks were allowed to allot credits under the land 
mortgage. 
The provisions of the Decree of the President were developed in the Resolution 
of the Government. In addition, the Resolution contains norms which were not 
present in the Decree. So, by this Resolution, collective and state farms were 
authorised to transfer objects of the social sphere such as residential houses, 
inter-farm roads, energy supply systems, water-supplies, gas supplies, telephone 
lines and other objects to the property of the Rural Councils. The Resolution 
envisaged such radical measures as the liquidation of collective and state farms, 
which had no financial resources for servicing the debt of wages and credits. 
According to this Resolution, they had to be announced insolvent (bankrupts) 
by February 1, 1992 and the liquidations and reorganisation had to take place 
during the first quarter of 1992. 
It is interesting to note that two months after the publication of this Resolution, 
an important update was introduced to its text, which cancelled the compulsion 
for collective and state farms to put their status in conformity with the Law "On 
the enterprises and entrepreneurial activity". They were allowed to stay 
collective state farms if  approved by assemblies of their labour collectives, and 
if the former juridical form of managing decisions about preservation of the 
land was fixed to them according to the current legislation. In practice, no 
collective farms declared bankruptcy. 
Agrarian reform, the frame of which was determined in the Decree of the 
President of December 27, 1991, and the Resolution of the Government of 
December 29 of the same year, did not proceed according to the prescriptions 
the President and the Government. The Decree and the Resolution were either 
 not executed at all, or were executed only formally by changing signboards 
without any essential or real changes in the functioning of agrarian institutions 
of the Soviet type.  
The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 27, 1993 "On 
regulation of land relations and the development of agrarian reform in Russia" 
(PASHOV 1999), was to substitute and act instead of the absent radical land law. 
Following the idea of its authors, it should have loosened the deadlock of 
agrarian reform in Russia. Among other things, this Decree provided that the 
proprietors of land shares have the right, without the consent of other joint 
owners, to assign a land lot in kind for management of a peasant farm, which 
they can mortgage and lease. They can also use it for the extension, up to the 
established norm, of a plot used for a personal household farm. This Decree 
allowed the proprietors of land shares, without the consent of other proprietors, 
to sell land shares to other members of the collective, and also – and it was a 
serious innovation – to other citizens and legal persons for agricultural 
production. 
At this time, an experiment in the Nizhniy Novgorod province was undertaken 
with technical assistance from the International Finance Corporation of the 
World Bank. Within the framework of this experiment, auctions for the sale and 
purchase of land shares and property shares took place inside some farms (IFC 
1995). The government approved this experiment in the Resolution of April 15, 
1994 "On the practice of agrarian transformations in the Nizhniy Novgorod 
province" (PASHOV 1999). A little later, on July 27, 1994, the government 
accepted a new Resolution "On reforming the agricultural enterprises taking 
into account the practice of Nizhniy Novgorod province" (PASHOV 1999). The 
rules of realisation for auctions distributing land and property inside farms for 
the reorganisation of agricultural enterprises were supplemented into this 
Resolution. 
On 1
st
 February 1995, in the Resolution "On the procedure of realisation of the 
rights of proprietors of land shares and property shares" (PASHOV 1999), the 
Government approved two documents enclosed in this resolution. They were 
"the Recommendations for preparation and issue of the documents about the 
right to land shares and property shares" and "the Recommendations about the 
order of disposal of land shares and property shares". These recommendations 
concretised the provisions already stated in the earlier accepted resolutions of 
Government on the agrarian reform. 
In 1996 it had already become clear that agrarian reform in Russia, as 
determined at the end of 1991 in the Decree of the President and Resolution of 
Government, had failed. The Decree of the President of March 27, 1996 "On the 
realisation of the constitutional rights of the citizens for land" (PASHOV 1999) is 
an implicit confession of it. It repeated once again what was already stated in 
the Decrees of 1991 and 1993, but which was not actually realised, and 
clarifications of the previous norms were offered so that they at last would 
begin to work.  
All above-mentioned legislative acts are founded on a certain theoretical basis. 
This basis is liberal neo-classical economic theory. According to this theory, an 
economy and its sectors, including agriculture, consist of independent actors: 
producers and consumers. All these actors produce, consume, buy and sell. 
Producers maximise their profits and consumers make their choices according 
to their consumer preferences. No structure or institutional framework (rules) 
for transactions between actors are envisaged in this theory9. Advocates of the 
neo-classical theory believe that those market structures or institutions are 
created rapidly by the introduction of new rules providing maximum freedom 
for these transactions10 or even by themselves in the process of transactions. The 
most important statement of the neo-classical theory is the following: if both 
types of actors (producers and consumers) make decisions in such a way as 
described above, then the market forces ('The Invisible Hand') inevitably 
establish so-called equilibrium prices and bring the allocation of scarce 
resources to the most efficient actors. From the point of view based on this 
theory, an initial allocation of resources among actors does not play an 
important role because market forces will change the situation rapidly in favour 
of the most efficient actors. Besides, in the liberal neo-classical theory, there is 
no state, and many advocates of this theory believe that the less state, the better.  
Agrarian privatisation in Russia was executed on an egalitarian basis. It meets 
the criteria of justice, but it does not at all exhibit the criteria of efficiency. But 
the authors of land reform legislation did not worry about that because they 
were neo-classical economists. They estimated that the most important thing is 
the right of owners of land and asset shares to buy and sell them. According to 
them, the inclusion of this right into legislation is sufficient to start a process of 
creation of viable agricultural enterprises on the land of former collective and 
state farms, with the subsequent concentration of land and other assets in the 
hands of the most efficient farmers. The reformers did not pay any attention to 
such an institution as PAF. 
An alternative to the neo-classical approach is the institutional approach. Actors 
in this theory are not independent and are not only producers and consumers. 
Instead, the state is one of the most important actors. Transactions between 
these actors are not spontaneous and are structured by formal and informal rules 
(institutions). The introduction of new legislation (formal rules) does not 
automatically change human behaviour. Informal rules rooted in traditions can 
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and HANSTAD 1999) and political scientists (WEGREN 1998). 
 continue to determine human behaviour and new formal rules can be rejected or 
not followed, or their application distorted, especially if they contradict interests 
of actors. The new legislation needs to be enforced (NORTH 1990).  
3 IMPEDIMENTS TO RUSSIAN AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE 1990'S  
We think that the current state of the Russian agrarian reform is a direct result 
of ignoring the nature of agrarian institutions inherited from Soviet times and 
the application of a liberal neo-classical approach in the law making process11. 
The most important problem which presents impediments to agrarian reform is 
the role of collective farms as the mechanisms of survival for rural 
communities.  
Rural dwellers understand very well that if former collective and state farms 
were substituted by real private enterprises, then they would lose the only 
source of survival they have: PAF or Subsistence Household Farm (SHF). They 
also understand that only a minority of them could create agricultural businesses 
and the majority would lose access to fodder from collective farms and would 
not be employed in the new private agricultural enterprises. That is why they 
resist any transformation of their collective state farms. They resist not as 
individuals, but as a community. So members of the community who wish to 
create private enterprises are under pressure from the community worried about 
subsistence household farms. Agrarian reform legislation provided rural 
dwellers with a very powerful tool for this resistance: privatisation of collective 
state farms by members of these farms on an egalitarian basis12. 
Egalitarian land distribution and the absence of alternatives to collective farms' 
survival mechanisms is the second impediment for agrarian reform in Russia. 
My multiple interviews with members of collective farms prove that they 
consider their land share certificates not as certificates of the right for decision-
making and dividends, but as certificates of their membership in the community 
for which the collective farm is a survival mechanism. They expect from the 
collective farm just the continuation of support for their PAFs and some other 
services, as was the case before the1990's. For rural dwellers, to sell land shares 
means psychologically and administratively to be excluded from the 
community, and it is impossible for those who continue to live in the village 
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 French sociologist HENRY MENDRAS 25 yeas ago foresaw a transformation of Soviet collective farms into a 
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collective au profit de leurs cultures et de leurs élevages individuels, et notamment de nourrir leur bétail avec 
des céréales détourné de la production commune…" (MENDRAS 1995, p. 54).  
(the absolute majority). Even when a collective farm is dismantled, and in this 
way the economic basis of the village community is disorganised, villagers look 
to be attached to some new community (sub-community of the old one) using 
their land shares. A pensioner perceives the leasing of her land share by a 
private farmer not really as a land transaction but as her affiliation to a 
community where the private farmer is the chief. The vital necessity for rural 
dwellers to be affiliated to a community for the provision of resources for their 
households and the role of collective farms as economic and organisational 
basis of the community is the main cause of the absence of land shares market. 
Workers of collective farms continue to work on these farms in spite of the fact 
that they are not paid for months and sometimes years. The do so in order to 
have access to the resources of the farm to maintain their PAF – the most 
important factor of their survival. 
The last but not least impediment to agrarian reform is the absence of a 
sufficient number of candidates prepared for private farming activity. The 
authors of the Russian agrarian reform legislation did not ask themselves who 
would become a private farmer cultivating his own land. They thought that a 
sufficient number of candidates prepared for private farming activity already 
existed in villages and cities. At the beginning of the 1990's, 3/4 of the creators 
of private family sized farms were city dwellers. Many of them left their farms 
quite rapidly. A large amount of money provided to them by the Russian 
government in the form of soft credits did not bring many results. After ten 
years of the private farming experience in Russia, empirical evidence says that 
the most efficient owners of private family agricultural businesses are former 
managers, especially chairmen and directors, of collective state farms. This is 
partially the result of their affiliation with local informal business and 
administrative networks, but it is also due to their entrepreneurial capacities, 
including communication. Ordinary members of former collective state farms 
are usually unable to run a business farm because of their insufficient 
educational, and more generally, cultural background. The requirements for 
private farmers in Russia to be successful are higher than in Europe because of 
a more complex and difficult to manage business environment, and because of 
the absence of adequate advisory services for private farmers.  
From the point of view of the medium- and long-term perspectives, maybe the 
most important mistake of Russian agrarian reform policy and legislation is the 
conservation of the orientation of agricultural education and training for a 
collective farm system. A very important part of the modernisation programmes 
of agriculture in European Union countries was always agricultural education 
and training. It is possible to say that Russia has already lost almost 10 years in 
making progress in this domain. 
 Surveys undertaken by the author between 1997-2000 in seven Russian 
provinces among rural civil officers, farms' heads, collective farms' workers, 
and also among professors and students of agricultural universities and colleges 
have revealed that the majority of those who are connected with agriculture 
share a common set of ideas and beliefs of a mythical nature. The most 
important statements of the dominant agrarian ideology oriented to support the 
inefficient Soviet style agricultural system are the following:  
 The state must control and finance agriculture as well as buy a large share of 
agricultural production, and supply to farms a large share of their needs for 
inputs; 
 Land is the people's public good, and cannot be sold or purchased; 
 In the West, private property is not important, and most Western farmers are 
tenants;  
 Russians have worked in collectives for centuries; they are collectivists; they 
can work only in collective farms; 
 Large collective farms are potentially more efficient than family farms 
because they can more successfully use the achievement of technological 
progress; 
 In the West, family farms are disappearing and large corporate farms 
produce most of the agricultural production; 
 The cause of non-profitability of collective farms is the disparity of 
agricultural and industrial product prices and the absence of sufficient 
support of agriculture by the Russian government; 
 All forms of farm enterprises, collective farms under different juridical 
forms, family farms, personal auxiliary farms, must be equal in rights and 
require support from the government. 
It is quite easy to refute all these statements. 
4 INCOMPATIBILITY OF CURRENT DOMINANT RUSSIAN AGRARIAN 
INSTITUTIONS WITH A MARKET ECONOMY 
The incompatibility of current Russian agrarian institutions with a market 
economy comes from the economic inefficiency of collective farms and 
universal theft and corruption as inherent features of the current Russian 
agricultural regime.  
The economic inefficiency of collective farms was obvious in the Soviet period 
when these farms were plunged into a favourable environment of the state 
control-input supply-output procurement. In the Soviet period, collective farms 
were low yield and/or high cost farms, but all of a farms' losses were covered by 
the state. Now that the state is no longer the only owner of all branches of the 
Russian economy, it is unable and unwilling to do so. Weak revenues of urban 
dwellers and the presence on the market of cheap imported food do not allow 
farm gate prices to grow. So collective farms are condemned to non-
profitability. An immediate consequence of this non-profitability is the 
degradation of farm machinery and equipment. The latter creates the situation 
that the collective farm is able to produce minimally just to provide fodder to 
household animals. In this way the whole branch is becoming subsistence-
oriented.  
In the Soviet period, three main institutions of the collective state farm system 
(collective farms, household farms and regional administrations) had coherent 
interaction between themselves. In pre-reform Russia, rural inhabitants lived to 
a large extent by producing food in their subsistence household farms. The 
livestock of household farms was fed by fodder produced in collective farms. 
Collective farms were obliged to follow their "first commandment": "to hand 
over grain (and other produce) to the state". The owner of all farms was the 
state and regional authorities, as representatives of the state in the region, 
controlled as much as they could the functioning of farms. Key decisions 
concerning farms were made not on farms but at the regional (district) level by 
communist party bureaucrats. But at the same time, regional authorities 
organised input supplies to farms and output procurement from them. All levels 
of authorities were responsible for the results of farms' functioning towards 
their superiors. Theft and corruption took place at that time, but could not 
surpass a certain level because of the existence of strong hierarchical control 
systems.  
The situation radically changed when Russia undertook transition to a market 
economy. The communist party, as a ruling core of the Russian society and 
economy, has disappeared. At the same time, all collective state farms have 
been formally privatised. The Soviet state was a bad owner of farms, but with 
the beginning of the transition, the collective farms were left without any owner 
at all. Afterwards, these farms were plunged into an unfavourable, and 
inadequate for them, environment of a market economy. Private traders, private 
farmers, household owners, all of them took advantage of the absence of a real 
owner of collective farms. Private traders buy farm products at a lower price 
than the market price by bribing the farm director. Private farmers 'buy', for a 
bottle of vodka, the fuel from a tractor driver of a collective farm. Practices 
which previously existed in the Soviet Union, 'nesunstvo' (taking), or of stealing 
(taking) fodder for household (personal auxiliary) farms' animals from 
collective state farms – have assumed a larger scale than before. Regional 
(district and province) authorities are no longer responsible for the results of a 
farms' functioning towards their superiors. They also take advantage of this 
situation and of the absence of real owners of collective farms to enrich 
themselves through large-scale corruption. They get bribes from private 
 companies and force collective farms to accept unprofitable conditions of input 
supplies and output sales. In this way, all three main institutions of the 
state/collective farms' system – collective farms, household farms and regional 
(district and province) administrations – are involved in illegal activities which 
destroy Russian agriculture.  
Collective farms and personal auxiliary farms connected closely with the former 
together makeup the dominant agrarian structures in Russia. The preservation of 
these structures in the market economy environment inevitably contributes to 
the degradation of the Russian agriculture, its growing primitivism, and 
increasing orientation to self-consumption by the village population. It is 
becoming inevitable because of the increasing wear of engineering inherited 
from the Soviet times. The latter provokes a gradual decrease of cultivated 
surface. Not only are poor lands abandoned. During my recent survey in the 
Kursk and Rostov provinces (black soil areas), local experts told me that 1/3 of 
agricultural land is not used and official statistics hide it by including it in the 
category "fallow". At the same time, these experts witness that this unused land 
is not accessible to the people outside of collective farms. 
5 A WAY FROM THE DEADLOCK 
The standstill in Russian land reform can be explained by a tacit but strong 
resistance to reform not only from the agrarian bureaucracy, but also from the 
totality of the rural population. They understand that the majority of them will 
not be employed by commercially-oriented agricultural enterprises and with real 
privatisation by efficient owners, they will lose access to resources that 
maintain their SHF – the only source of their survival. 
In order to find a way out from this deadlock, it is necessary to divide business 
and social support functions. Business farms do not have to fulfil social 
functions. These functions should be exercised by special non-commercial 
organisations. Forms of these organisations could be agricultural consumers' co-
operatives and municipal enterprises. The establishment of agricultural 
consumers' co-operatives or municipal community support enterprises in each 
village might help to solve the above-mentioned problems. 
Agricultural consumers' co-operatives and municipal community support 
enterprises should be created to execute the following functions: 
 Production of fodder, including green pastures and a free supply of fodder to 
SHF in the minimum quantities required for one rural family; 
 Production of food grain, bread baking and a free supply to countrymen at 
predetermined norms; 
 Supply (for fee) of fodder to personal farms above the amounts supplied free 
of charge; 
 Delivery of paid services for selling SHF produce; 
 Transport and other paid services for members of the community; 
 Financial support of certain social infrastructure facilities. 
Subsistence household farms and agricultural consumer co-operatives 
(municipal community support enterprises) that back them are not the most 
efficient forms of organisation for agricultural production. The creation of 
agricultural consumer co-operatives (municipal community support enterprises) 
is a forced measure required in order to mitigate the difficulties of efficient 
market transition experienced by the countrymen. It also creates opportunities 
for the more painless implementation of real privatisation and restructuring of 
former kolkhozes/sovkhozes when efficient private agricultural commercial 
ventures are created on their lands not being used for the organisation of 
agricultural consumers' co-operatives or municipal community support 
enterprises. In this case the rural community will be far less resistant to the 
creation of private enterprises because there is a guarantee of free fodder supply 
for the community members' SHF by agricultural consumers' co-operatives or 
municipal community support enterprises.  
Some calculations show that approximately 1/3 of the land of former 
kolkhoze/sovkhoze (depending on density of population and soil fertility) is 
necessary for the creation of such agricultural consumer co-operatives 
(municipal community support enterprises). This also corresponds to expert 
estimates made by certain heads of collective farms in the Samara province that 
1/3 of the resources of the collective farm serves to support the SHF. In fact, in 
many other provinces of Russia, especially in the non-chernozem zone, the 
share of resources used to support the SHF is approaching 100%. A rational 
organisation of agricultural consumers' co-operatives or municipal community 
support enterprises does not need all the collective farm's land. Much land 
would remain for the creation of real private agricultural enterprises, including 
business-oriented family farms. 
Current Russian legislation permits the creation of such agricultural consumers' 
co-operatives in each village by every family wishing to join in the consumer 
co-operative of the village contributing a part of their land and assets shares. 
Similar procedures can be applied for the creation of municipal community 
support enterprises by giving this part to local administration. Every version of 
the community support enterprise has its pluses and minuses, however, 
especially taking into consideration the ongoing difficulties in Russia of the 
self-organisation of rural dwellers; the version of municipal enterprise therefore 
has more chance for success. 
If the choice is made in favour of a consumer co-operative, then the following 
principles must be applied: 
  The chairman and the director of the co-operative are different persons. The 
first one is a representative of the community with the task to supervise the 
functioning of the co-operative in the interests of its members. The second is 
a professional manager employed by the co-operative; 
 Members and workers in consumer co-operatives are, in principle, also 
different persons. Members of the co-operative have rights for free and paid 
services irrespective of whether or not they work in the co-operative. 
Workers of the co-operative are much less numerous than members and can, 
in practice, be employed from outside of the community; 
 A consumer co-operative is not a profit-oriented organisation. Such co-
operatives don't have to pay income tax because their income is returned in 
one form or another to its members. Special favourable tax conditions must 
be created for this kind of enterprise. 
Fixed assets of agricultural consumer co-operatives and municipal community 
support enterprises can be created to a large extent by assembling a part of land 
and assets shares of community members. Working capital should be provided 
by the State under the form of gift and soft credits.  
We suggest that Russian legislators enact a special law on the communal rural 
community support enterprise and to make necessary amendments to the law on 
agricultural co-operation concerning specific consumers' co-operatives 
described above.  
In order to create favourable conditions for the emergence of efficient private 
farming businesses on the lands left over on collective farms after the 
organisation of agricultural consumer co-operatives or municipal community 
support enterprises (2/3 of agricultural lands), adequate legislation and 
institutions must be put in place. 
REFERENCES 
CHAYANOV, A.V. (ed.) (1928): Results of the Decade of Soviet Power in Figures 1917 – 1927, 
Moscow. 
CHAYANOV, A.V. (1966): The Theory of Peasant Economy, Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin. 
DE CHOMBART LAUWE, J. (1961): Les paysans soviétiques, Editions du Seuil, Paris. 
IFC (1995): Land Privatization and Farm Reorganization in Russia, The World Bank, Washington, 
D.C. 
MENDRAS, H. (1995): Les sociétés paysannes, Editions Gallimard, Paris. 
NORTH, D. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
PASHOV, M.C. (ed.) (1999): Agrarian Legislation of the Russian Federation, Collection of Legislative 
Acts and Documents, Yurist, Moscow, (in Russian).  
PROSTERMAN, R., HANSTAD, T. (eds.) (1999): Legal Impediments to Effective Rural Land Relations 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, The World Bank Technical Paper, No. 436, The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
SAHLINS, M. (1972): Stone Age Economics, Aldine-Alerton, New York. 
STALIN, J. (1952): Questions of Leninism, Politizdat, Moscow. 
WEGREN, S.K. (1998): Agriculture and the State in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsbugh. 
YEFIMOV, V. (1997): Approche institutionnelle de l'analyse de la transition (le cas de l'agriculture du 
Nord-Kazakhstan), Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, Vol. 28, No. 2, Paris.  
YEFIMOV, V. (2001): Continuité et recomposition des régimes agraires russes dans le siècle, Economie 
et Société, Série: Développement, croissance et progrès, Développement – III, No. 9-10, ISMEA, 
Paris, pp. 1439-1476. 
YEFIMOV, V. (2002): Transformations agraires en Russie (Idéologies, législations, fonctionnement des 
institutions), PhD dissertation, IUED, Geneva University, 2002.  
 APPENDIX 
Table 1: Average Russian Peasant (Household) Farm in 1924/1925 
 Number of 
Persons in the 
Household 
Agricultural 
Land, ha 
Arable 
Land, 
ha 
Horses Oxen Cows Total Cattle 
Converted in 
Adult Units 
Zone of Consumption 6.01 6.5 3.46 0.98 0.00 1.69 3.73 
Zone of Production 6.10 9.46 7.68 0.92 0.09 1.19 3.51 
North-Caucasus 6.05 10.3 7.35 1.06 0.92 1.64 5.63 
Source: CHAYANOV (1928, p. 199). 
Table 2: Table from Nemchinov's Memorandum to Stalin (1928) 
 Grain Production Marketable Grain % of Marketability 
 Mln. Puds % Mln. Puds % 
Before the War 
Landlords 600 12.0 281.6 21.6 47.0 
Kulaks 1,900 38.0 650.0 50.0 34.0 
Middle/Poor Peasants 2,500 50.0 369.0 28.4 14.7 
Total 5,000 100 1,300.6 100 26.0 
After the War (in 1926/1927) 
Sovkhozes/Kolkhozes 80.0 1.7 37.8 6.0 47.2 
Kulaks 617.0 13.0 126.0 20.0 20.0 
Middle/Poor Peasants 4,052.0 85.3 166.2 74.0 11.2 
Total 4,749.0 100 630.0 100 13.3 
Source: STALIN (1952, p. 194). 
Table 3: Chayanov's Survey of 1910 in the Volokolamsk District of 
Moscow Province 
Eaters/Workers Ratio 1.01 – 1.20 1.21 – 1.40 1.41 – 1.60 1.61 –  
Production per Worker in Rubles 131.9 151.5 218.8 284.4 
Number of Working Days per Worker 98.8 102.3 157.2 161.3 
Source: CHAYANOV (1966). 
Table 4: Chayanov's survey of 1912-1913 "Production per worker in 
rubles" 
Eaters/Workers Ratio 1.00 – 1.15 1.16 – 1.30 1.31 – 1.45 1.46 – 1.60  1.61 –  
Starobelsk District of Kharkov 
Province 
68.1 99.0 118.3 128.9 156.4 
Vologda District of Vologda Province 63.9 79.1 84.4 91.7 117.9 
Velsk District of Vologda Province 59.2 61.2 76.1 79.5 95.5 
Source: CHAYANOV (1966). 
Table 5: Share of Incomes from PAFs in Households' Incomes of 
Kolkhozes' Members 
1970* 1980* 1980 1985* 1985 1990 1991 1992 
35.1 27.5 25.1 26.2 21.8 21.5 30.0 41.6 
Note: * data for the USSR. 
Source: Russian Federation in 1992, Goscomstat, Economy of the USSR in 1988, Goscomstat.  
Table 6: Parts of Different Types of Farms in Russian Agricultural 
Production, in percent 
 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
"Agricultural Enterprises" 76.9 73.7 68.8 67.1 57.0 54.5 50.2 49.0 46.5 38.7 40.3 
Households' Farms 23.1 26.3 31.2 31.8 39.9 43.8 47.9 49.1 51.1 59.2 57.2 
"Peasant Farms" 0 0 0 1.1 3.1 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.5 
Source: Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000). 
Table 7: Distribution of Agricultural Lands Between Different Types of 
Farms, in percent 
 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
"Agricultural enterprises" 98.4 98.1 91.2 85.2 82.8 82.4 81.7 81.4 80.4 83.7 81.9 
Household Farms 1.6 1.8 2.6 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.4 6.0 
Personal Gardens 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Personal Auxiliary Farms 1.4 1.3 1.9 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.8 
"Peasant Farms" - 0.1 0.6 3.1 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.7 6.6 6.9 
Communal Pastures - - 5.6 7.2 7.7 7.7 8.3 8.3 8.4 4.0 4.9 
Note: *Author's estimates. 
Source: Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000).  
Table 8: Personal Auxiliary Farms (Rural Household Farms) 
 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number, Millions 15.7 16.3 17.1 19.3 16.6 16.6 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.0 15.5 
Middle Size, ha 0.2 0.2 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.4 0.4 
Source: Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000). 
Table 9: Evolution of Production Indices of Household Farms 
 Previous Year = 100% Year 1990 = 100% 
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Potatoes 103 120 97 97 85 100 176 171 166 141 141 
Vegetables 95 129 99 103 99 113 260 270 270 270 300 
Meat 104 96 98 98 99 96 112 110 108 106 104 
Milk 102 100 100 99 100 100 122 122 121 121 121 
Source: Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000); Agricultural activity of households in Russia, 
Goscomstat (1999). 
Table 10: Herd Size in Household Farms, Thousands of Heads 
  
1990 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
% in National Herd 
1990 1998 
Cattle Total 9,866 11,394 10,901 10,425 9,919 17.3 34.8 
Cows 5,235 6,705 6,483 6,238 5,979 25.5 44.4 
Pigs 7,076 7,556 7,246 6,963 7,393 18.5 42.9 
Sheep 13,584 11,030 9,426 8,487 4,339 24.6 54.7 
Goats 2,510 2,398 2,214 2,073 1,951 87.1 91.0 
Horses 274 765 799 827 820 10.5 45.5 
Rabbits 3,692 1,437 1,250 1,116 1,065 80.3 92.8 
Poultry* 195 161 151 143 139 29.5 39.0 
Bees** 2,771 3,107 2,911 2,837 2,887 61.5 82.0 
Notes: * in millions of heads, ** in thousands of beehives. 
Source: Agricultural activity of households in Russia, Goscomstat (1999). 
 Table 11: Comparison of the Evolutions of Yields in Household Farms 
and National Average Yields  
 Households' Farms National Average Yields 
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Potatoes, c/ha 113 120 116 113 96 104 117 114 111 97 
Vegetables, c/ha 148 161 154 151 147 167 148 145 147 141 
Beef, kg/head 188 156 151 156 161 121 93 88 96 103 
Pork, kg/head 300 202 191 195 202 118 99 96 109 120 
Milk, kg/cow/year 2,582 2,388 2,412 2,462 2,558 2,731 2,153 2,144 2,239 2,381 
Source: Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000); Agricultural activity of households in Russia, 
Goscomstat (1999).  
Table 12: Comparison of Evolutions of Marketability of Household 
Farms and Agricultural Enterprises (Former 
Kolkhozes/Sovkhozes), in percent 
 Households' Farms "Agricultural Enterprises" 
 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Potatoes  28.5 12.2 10.2 10.0 10.2 42.9 32.5 34.7 38.7 43.5 
Vegetables 16.7 8.8 8.8 9.5 9.5 92.2 71.3 73.8 72.0 83.0 
Meat 30.1 23.0 23.2 22.9 22.4 97.4 100 100 100 99.8 
Milk 25.1 18.4 18.4 18.3 18.3 90.4 78.8 78.3 80.3 78.5 
Source: Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat, 1998, 2000; Agricultural activity of households in Russia, 
Goscomstat (1999).  
